Water Law Review
Volume 13

Issue 1

Article 21

9-1-2009

Gannon v. Rumbaugh, 2009 WL 1913668 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009)
Ellen Michaels

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/wlr

Custom Citation
Ellen Michaels, Court Report, Gannon v. Rumbaugh, 2009 WL 1913668 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009), 13 U. Denv.
Water L. Rev. 215 (2009).

This Court Report is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Denver Sturm College of Law at
Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Water Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

Issue I

COURT REPORTS

court, citing United States v. Oregon, explained that the federal
government retained title to non-navigable waters. However, courts use
the relevant state law to interpret grants by the federal government for
lands bounding on non-navigable waters if the grants lack a reservation
or restriction of terms.
Since the meander lines encircled the Lake, the court held that the
federal government did not expressly grant the Lake; as a result, the
court held that the federal government impliedly conveyed the lakebed
to the abutting landowners. After revisiting the court's previous
decisions in Stroup v. Matthews, Johnson v. Hurst, and Ulbright v.
Baslington, the court held that owners of land abutting a non-navigable
lake also take title to the land between the ends of the meander line and
the water, as well as part of the lakebed.
Since the federal government originally surveyed the land
surrounding the Lake, and nothing indicated the federal government
had reserved an interest in the Lake, the court concluded that the grant
to the Mesenbrinks' predecessor included land along and under the
Lake. The court explained that the boundary lines ran from the ends of
the meander lines to the middle of the Lake, and that the ordinary high
water mark is irrelevant when determining the ownership of land
underlying non-navigable waters. Additionally, the court ruled the
public trust doctrine inapplicable because the Lake was non-navigable.
Accordingly the Idaho Supreme Court vacated and remanded the
case to the district court for proceedings in accordance with the opinion.
Andrew Reitman
IOWA
Gannon v. Rumbaugh, 2009 WL 1913668 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009)
(holding that (1) neither the holder of a dominant or servient estate may
obstruct the natural flow of water running from the dominant estate
onto the servient estate; (2) holders of the dominant estate may not
substantially increase water flow over servient landowner's estate or
interfere with the natural watercourse; and (3) drainage improvements
are not "authorized by law" if the drainage district that created the
improvements no longer exists).
The plaintiffs' (Gannons and Steenhoeks) farmlands adjoin the
defendants' (Rumbaughs) estate. The Steenhoeks' estate is uphill from
the Rumbaughs', making the Steenhoeks' land the dominant estate and
the Rumbaughs' the servient estate. The Gannons' estate is downhill
from the Rumbaughs' land, making the Rumbaughs' estate the dominant
estate and the Gannons' estate the servient estate. The Gannons and
Steenhoeks sued the Rumbaughs after heavy rains flooded their
farmlands. They argued that the Rumbaughs caused the flooding when
they lowered a levee on their property and filled a roadside ditch. The
District Court of Jasper County found that: (1) the Rumbaughs
negligently increased the flow of water onto the Gannons' property and
negligently prevented water from flowing from the Steenhoeks' lands;
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and (2) the drainage improvements the Rumbaughs removed were
"authorized by law." The Rumbaughs appealed.
The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's finding that
the Rumbaughs' negligently filled the roadside ditch. The court held
that water from a dominant estate must be allowed to flow its natural
course onto a servient estate. Neither the dominant estate holder, nor
the servient estate holder may obstruct the flow of water from the
dominant estate. The district court heard testimony that water from the
Steenhoeks' estate flowed onto the Rumbaughs' servient estate and that,
by filling in the roadside ditch, the Rumbaughs caused surface water to
accumulate and remain on the Steenhoeks' property. According to the
court, changes in the ditch obstructed the flow of water from the
Steenhoeks' estate, caused the Steenhoeks' land to flood, and thereby
interfered with the Steenhoeks' free use of their property.
Although the court affirmed that the Rumbaughs acted negligently
by filling the roadside ditch, the court held that the Rumbaughs did not
act negligently when they lowered the levee on their property.
According to the court, the owner of the dominant estate is entitled to
all the natural advantages of the location and contour of his land.
However, the holder of a dominant estate cannot substantially increase
the amount of water flowing onto a servient estate or substantially
change a natural watercourse. Here, the court determined that there
was no evidence indicating that the Rumbaughs substantially increased
the amount of water flowing onto the Gannons' property.
Furthermore, the court rejected the Gannons' argument that the
Rumbaughs substantially diverted a natural watercourse by removing
the levee. The court distinguished between the surface waters that
damaged the Gannons' lands and waters from creeks, rivers, and lakes.
Whereas waters from creeks, rivers, and lakes are substantial and
definite, surface waters are temporary in nature, spread at random,
occupy lands normally used for other purposes, and follow no definite
course. However, if the surface water uniformly or habitually flows over
a given course, this constitutes a watercourse. The court determined
that, even if a watercourse existed on the Gannon's land prior to the
removal of the levee, the surface water did not follow a natural
watercourse because the man-made levee directed the flow of the
water.
The court also found that the Rumbaughs did not violate an Iowa
statute providing that any person who breaks a levee or obstructs a
*ditch "authorized by law" may be liable to pay injured plaintiffs double
damages. The district court concluded that the Gannons and Steenhoeks
were entitled to double damages because the levee system, when
constructed, was "authorized by law." The Rumbaughs argued that the
levee was not "authorized by law" because the drainage district that
established the levee had since disbanded. The court, finding no
evidence that a drainage district still existed, held that neither the levee,
nor the ditch was "authorized by law."
Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's decision that
filling the roadside ditch constituted a negligent act, vacated the district
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court's determination that the Rumbaughs acted negligently when they
removed the levee, and vacated the district court's determination that
the levee and roadside ditch were "authorized by law."
Ellen Michaels
KANSAS
Frick Farm Props. v. Kan. Dep't of Agric., 216 P.3d 170 (Kan. 2009)
(holding that a water right holder's unexcused nonuse of a beneficial
water right for five consecutive years coupled with the failure to
maintain annual water use documentation was sufficient to establish a
prima facie case for termination of the water right).
Frick Farm Properties ("Frick Farm") challenged an administrative
order by the Department of Agriculture, Division of Water Resources
that terminated their water rights. The District Court of Pawnee County
and the Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed the agency's termination
based upon Frick Farm's nonuse for five successive years without due
and sufficient cause. Frick Farm appealed to the Kansas Supreme Court
on two issues: (1) whether the agency impermissibly shifted the burden
of proof to Frick Farm; and (2) whether there was sufficient evidence to
establish two periods of nonuse without due and sufficient cause.
According to section 82(a)-718(a) of the Kansas Statutes, once a
water appropriation right is created, it is subject to loss or forfeiture if
an owner fails to use the water right for a period of five successive years
without due and sufficient cause. Under section 5-7-1(b) of the Kansas
Administrative Regulations, in order to constitute due and sufficient
cause, the reason purporting to justify nonuse must have in fact
prevented, or made unnecessary, the authorized beneficial use of water.
The owner of a water right must also file an annual water use report
with the chief engineer of the division of water resources specifying
whether the owner used their water rights, and if not, the reason for
nonuse. Furthermore, section 82-718(a) of the Kansas Statutes states
that the verified report of the chief engineer shall be prima facie
evidence of the abandonment and termination of a water right.
In 2002, Frick Farm acquired their property and appurtenant water
rights from Bernard Debes ("Debes"). In 2003, Frick Farm considered
transferring the property to a third party and discovered Debes's
inadequate documentation of the water right.
In 2006, the chief engineer of the Division of Water Resources
(DWR) concluded that there were two periods of nonuse without due
and sufficient cause and therefore deemed the water right abandoned
and terminated. During the first period, from 1985 to 1991, Debes
reported irrigation only for 1985, but reported no use for the other six
years. He provided a justification for nonuse only for 1989, claiming
that his wheat crops froze. Frick Farm contended that from 1986-1988,
Debes produced crops that did not require' irrigation. Although the
DWR could not ascertain what crops Debes planted in 1990, they
determined that he planted a non-irrigated crop in 1991. The DWR

